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Abstract
One-sided network communication technologies such as
RDMA and NVMe-over-Fabrics are quickly gaining adoption
in production software and in datacenters. Although appeal-
ing for their low CPU utilization and good performance, they
raise new security concerns that could seriously undermine
datacenter software systems building on top of them. At the
same time, they offer unique opportunities to help enhance se-
curity. Indeed, one-sided network communication is a double-
edged sword in security. This paper presents our insights into
security implications and opportunities of one-sided commu-
nication.
1 Introduction
Traditional network communication in datacenters takes a two-
sided form where both the sender and the receiver machines’
CPU and software (OS or user-level programs) are involved
in processing network requests. Several recent technologies
in datacenters enable one-sided communication where the
receiving machine’s CPU and software are completely by-
passed in the processing of incoming network requests. In-
stead, network hardware devices handle incoming requests
and directly read/write into host machine’s memory (e.g.,
RDMA, Gen-Z [12], Omni-Path [4]), storage (e.g., NVMe-
over-Fabrics [37]), or GPU memory (e.g., GPUDirect [9]).
Because of its low CPU utilization and low-latency perfor-
mance, one-sided communication has been adopted in dis-
tributed in-memory systems [3, 10], fast storage systems [37],
and new architectures like resource disaggregation [20, 45].
Prior research efforts and production systems have focused
on one-sided communication’s performance, scalability, pro-
grammability, and network protocols, ignoring one important
factor in datacenters, security.
We call for attention to the security aspects of one-sided
network communication. We study the basic communication
patterns and real hardware implementations of one-sided com-
munication to understand its implications in security. Based
on our findings, we draw several key insights in fundamental
issues, challenges, and potential solutions in achieving secure
one-sided communication. The most interesting high-level
insight is that one-sided communication is a double-edged
sword in security: it can cause security threats and offer op-
portunities in enhancing security at the same time.
First, one-sided communication’s feature of not having any
software processing at the receiving side poses unique threats
in distributed systems. For example, malicious clients can read
or write to remote storage servers with one-sided network
requests without being noticed, making it hard to account
for errors. Attackers can also easily launch Denial of Service
attacks using one-sided communication to swamp the network
or the target machine’s memory or storage resources.
Second, in order to bypass host processors, hardware de-
vices that enable one-sided communication have to imple-
ment functionalities that are traditionally built in software.
We identified several security issues in one-sided hardware,
some caused by features added for better performance, some
by the need to bypass host CPU, and some by ill-designed
implementation.
Finally, one-sided communication provides a good oppor-
tunity to hide accesses from software, making it easier to
achieve user privacy in datacenters. We designed a secure
data store system that leverages one-sided communication
to enhance the performance of traditional oblivious RAM
systems while delivering the same security guarantees.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• As far as we know, this is the first work to discuss secu-
rity aspects in one-sided communication.
• We identified fundamental limitations in one-sided com-
munication that can pose security threats.
• We discovered new security issues in real one-sided hard-
ware devices.
• We leverage one-sided communication to enhance the
performance of an ORAM system.
2 One-Sided Communication in Datacenters
This section provides a background on one-sided communi-
cation and applications built based on it.
One-Sided Communication and Enabling Technologies.
One-sided communication is a type of network communi-
cation pattern where only the sender side’s software is in-
volved in network request processing but not the receiver side
(thus the term “one-sided”). One-sided communication can
take different forms with different technologies and hardware.
The most famous and popular technology is RDMA, a net-
work technology that allows senders to access memory on
remote machines directly without the involvement of remote
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machines’ CPUs. Similar to RDMA, Omni-Path [4] is a high-
performance fabric architecture developed by Intel to support
one-sided network communication. Gen-Z [12] is another
interconnect technology designed for fast, direct access to a
small (e.g., the scale of a rack) pool of memory devices and it
supports one-sided accesses to remote memory.
Apart from memory-based systems, one-sided communica-
tion is also used to access storage systems and accelerators.
NVMe-over-Fabrics [37] is a technology that allows direct net-
work access to NVMe-based storage devices. GPUDirect [9]
is a technology that allows direct access to remote GPU mem-
ory from the network.
Applications Based on One-Sided Communication. Com-
pared with traditional two-sided communication, one-sided
communication offers key advantages in reducing CPU uti-
lization and in improving performance. These benefits fit
datacenters’ performance and cost needs, making one-sided
communication appealing in recent datacenter systems. For
example, Microsoft Azure and Alibaba have deployed RDMA
in large, production scale [2, 54]. There has also been a host
of research work in RDMA and other one-sided technologies
in recent years.
Below, we list a representative set of applications that are
based on or support one-sided communication. These include
in-memory key-value stores [10, 11, 26, 38, 39], in-memory
databases and transactional systems [6, 59, 63], graph pro-
cessing systems [48, 61], consensus implementations [41, 57],
distributed non-volatile memory systems [30, 46, 64], remote
swap systems [1, 17], NVMe-based storage systems [18, 31],
and resource disaggregation systems [19].
All these previous systems focus on the performance, scal-
ability, cost, programmability, and correctness of one-sided
communication. The rest of this paper will demonstrate that
one-sided communication presents many new security issues
and opportunities and we call for attention to the security
aspect of one-sided communication.
3 Threats of One-Sided Communication
While the processing needs at receiver nodes increase CPU uti-
lization in two-sided communication, the receiver’s process-
ing software stack provides the means to implement various
security defenses. In contrast, the lack of receiver involvement
in one-sided network communication poses several security
threats in datacenter environments. This session discusses
two fundamental threats of one-sided communication.
Threats to accountability. In distributed, multi-tenant data-
center environments, many parties can potentially cause errors
(e.g., node failures, data corruption, stealing information). It
is important to account for errors when they happen. Ac-
countability enables the pinpointing of the party responsible
for a problem and allows other parties to be proven inno-
cent [42]. In a threat model where a server hosts data that
multiple clients can read and write, an attacker can be one of
the clients that desire to write malicious data or read other
clients’ data without being noticed.
Under two-sided communication, the receiver handles all
incoming network requests and can identify their senders,
providing a means for accountability. However, it is funda-
mentally difficult for one-sided communication to be account-
able, because CPU and software are completely bypassed
at the receiving side. Attackers can exploit this vulnerabil-
ity to perform one-sided network operations without being
detected. For example, in RDMA-based in-memory storage
systems that support one-sided writes [6, 56, 63], an attacker
client can write malicious data to any locations in the store
without being detected. One possible way benign clients can
avoid reading unaccountable data is to authenticate the writer
of the data with encryption keys. However, this mechanism
needs a fair amount of computation, and the performance
overhead is especially large considering one-sided networks’
high speeds [32, 36].
Threats in denial of service. Without any processing at the
receiving side, one-sided communication also makes it hard
to throttle the speed of network requests from any particular
sender. This limitation can be exploited to launch different
types of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [43]. Our threat
model here is a cloud environment where an attacker has
one-sided network accesses to a server that provides some ser-
vice (e.g., an RDMA-based key-value store, GPU acceleration
with GPUDirect) to multiple clients. An attacker can flood
the network to the server with a large number of one-sided
network requests without being detected.
Another potential DoS attack that is different from tradi-
tional network DoS attacks is to exhaust a server’s hardware
resources that are used to provide one-sided communication
services. For example, RDMA NICs (RNICs), devices that
enable one-sided RDMA operations, store metadata for net-
work connections and memory spaces in on-NIC SRAM so
that RNICs can process incoming one-sided requests without
involving the host machine. Attackers can fill the on-NIC
SRAM by accessing many different memory spaces, forc-
ing the receiver’s RNIC to evict victims’ metadata. To make
it worse, the server cannot tell which client is the attacker,
because the attacker’s one-sided network traffic cannot be
detected by the server.
Discussion and defenses. Attacks that can successfully ex-
ploit the above two vulnerabilities rely on the assumption that
their traffic cannot be sniffed by trusted parties. We believe
this assumption to be reasonable because most packet sniffing
tools require the root privilege to run and datacenter adminis-
trators usually prohibit packet sniffing. For example, packet
sniffing is prohibited by RNIC by default and requires the
RNIC administrator privilege to change the default configura-
tion [35, 53, 55].
While many traditional defense mechanisms may not work
or will break the one-sided communication pattern, we iden-
tified two possible directions for future defenses. First, at
n−th MR registered
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Figure 2: Timing Differences in ConnectX-5.
the sender, we can employ defense mechanisms to monitor or
control network activities before network requests are sent out
with the help of an intermediate layer like LITE [56] or with
traffic dump tools [35, 53]. Second, at the receiver, we can
enhance the hardware devices that handle one-sided requests
with better security features, for example, by programming
SmartNICs.
4 Vulnerabilities in One-Sided Hardware
To be able to bypass CPU at the receiver machine, hardware
devices that enable one-sided communication need to imple-
ment many functionalities that are traditionally implemented
in software such as permission checking and address map-
ping. However, hardware is not flexible and most existing
one-sided hardware devices are not programmable. It is hard
to add security features in hardware and security is usually an
afterthought in hardware design.
A major threat model we envision is a cloud environment
that provides in-memory data store services to cloud users,
similar to the threat model in Section 3. A victim accesses
data that a server hosts by issuing one-sided network requests
from a client machine. The attacker runs on another client
machine and is another user of the cloud data store service
(i.e., the attacker has no access to the victim or the server
machines).
This section presents three real cases of security issues in
one-sided hardware devices. These security vulnerabilities
could potentially be exploited to launch real attacks with the
above threat model, but we leave the design of real attacks for
future work.
Case 1: hardware-managed “keys” are not secret. RNICs
use a pair of “keys”, lkey and rkey, to protect the local and
remote access of each memory region or MR. An RNIC of a
machine generates and stores lkey and rkey (together with the
memory address) at the time when a user process registers an
MR on the machine. Applications running on other machines
use the virtual memory address of a registered MR and its rkey
to access it. When receiving an RDMA request, the RNIC
checks its access permission using the rkey.
Surprisingly, we discovered that RNICs generate rkeys in
a predictable, sequential pattern with Mellanox ConnectX-3,
ConnectX-4, and ConnectX-5 RNICs, the three most popular
generations of RNICs. Figure 1 plots the values of lkey/rkey
of the first 5000 MRs that are registered at a host in the order
of the registration time (lkey and rkey have exactly the same
values for all MRs). For all the three generations of RNICs,
there are clear and easy-to-guess patterns in lkey/rkey values.
Moreover, the first 500 MRs have sequentially increasing
lkey/rkey values.
Most RDMA-based in-memory storage systems use a small
number of large MRs [10, 56], making it even easier for at-
tackers to guess MR keys. After guessing both the rkey and
the memory address of an MR (the latter can be guessed in a
similar way as traditional buffer-overflow attacks), attackers
can gain full access to the MR, overwriting victims’ memory
content or stealing their data.
Case 2: side channels in RNICs. A key functionality that
all RNICs support for one-sided communication is to map
from virtual memory addresses to DMA (physical) addresses.
These mappings are essentially page table entries (PTEs) that
are stored in host machines’ DRAM. For better performance,
RNICs cache hot PTEs in its on-board SRAM. In addition
to PTEs, RNICs also cache MR metadata such as lkeys and
rkeys for hot MRs. An RNIC fetches metadata from its host
machine’s main memory when receiving RDMA requests
whose metadata is not in the RNIC’s SRAM.
We evaluated one-sided RDMA requests’ latency when
both the data’s PTE and MR metadata is in SRAM (hit), when
the data’s PTE is not in SRAM (PTE miss), and when the
data’s MR metadata is not in SRAM (MR miss). Figure 2
presents the timing differences of these three cases over 1000
trials of each case. There is a clear difference between hits
and misses, which can be used to establish side channels on
RNICs. Since RDMA accesses from different applications
share the same RNIC SRAM, it is possible to further build
real side-channel and covert-channel attacks based on these
timing channels.
Case 3: exposing physical memory addresses to remote
machines. Another case where RNIC design can threat secu-
rity is a feature designed to improve performance. By default,
user processes register MRs with RNICs using virtual memory
addresses in their address spaces and RNICs store the virtual
to physical memory address mapping in their SRAM. To elim-
inate the space and performance overhead of address mapping,
Mellanox ConnectX-4 and later versions of Mellanox RNICs
introduce a new feature that allows user processes to register
MRs directly using physical memory addresses [34]. Appli-
cations running on other machines can use these physical
memory addresses to access the MRs.
Exposing physical memory addresses poses many new se-
curity threats, since knowing physical memory address layout
is the basis of many attacks. For example, knowing physical
memory addresses make both rowhammer [16, 24, 62] and
throwhammer [52] attacks easier. Although registering MRs
with physical address improves performance, we recommend
applications builders to take caution when using this feature.
Discussion. While the three cases presented in this section all
happen with Mellanox RNICs, we believe that similar issues
can happen with other one-sided hardware and that there are
deep-rooted reasons for why they happen. There are clear
tradeoffs between including more security functionalities in
hardware devices and the devices’ performance and cost. For
one-sided devices, vendors usually choose the latter over se-
curity, because what makes one-sided devices appealing is
their superior performance and low cost (on saving CPU uti-
lization). For example, the side channel threats in Case 2 are a
result of vendors choosing performance (caching hot metadata
in on-board SRAM) and cost saving (maximize the utilization
of SRAM by not isolating SRAM space across applications)
over security.
Mitigating security issues in one-sided hardware imple-
mentation is possible. For example, RNICs can use crypto-
graphically generated keys as lkey and rkey (Case 1); they can
isolate SRAM for different applications or introduce noise to
disturb timing differences (Case 2); and they can remove the
exposure of physical memory addresses (Case 3). Certain one-
sided hardware vendors have manufactured SmartNICs that
supports one-sided network communication [32, 33]. Various
defense mechanisms can be implemented on these Smart-
NICs (e.g., encryption). Despite the promise of the above
mitigations, it is still challenging but important to deliver se-
curity features with minimal impacts on performance, cost,
and hardware complexity.
5 Opportunity of One-Sided Communication
Although one-sided communication poses different threats
to datacenter security, it provides one great opportunity to
enhance security. Users can ensure their privacy by hiding
their network activities from receiving servers using one-sided
communication. This session discusses how we can leverage
this opportunity to develop secure and fast data storage sys-
tems.
5.1 Environment and Threat Model
ORAM, or oblivious RAM, is a type of technology that makes
access patterns “oblivious” by continuously re-encrypting and
reshuffling data blocks at storage servers [13–15,25,40,47,50,
51, 58]. There have been various secure storage systems built
based on ORAM in the past [5, 29, 44, 44, 49, 60]. One widely
used ORAM system is Path ORAM [49]. The basic idea of
Path ORAM is to organize the server storage as a binary tree
where each node holds a number of (encrypted) objects (e.g.,
key-value pairs). Each client caches a small amount of data
locally in a stash. Client read and write requests are handled
in the same Path ORAM protocol to make reads and writes
indistinguishable. To perform a client request (read or write)
to an object, the client identifies the path (nodes from a leaf
to the root) that contains the object using a locally stored
mapping table. The client then reads the entire path into its
local stash (read step). Afterwards, it remaps the requested
object to a random leaf node and writes all the objects in the
path it has read in the read step (with a new value if it is a
client write request). If there are other objects on the path in
the client’s stash, they can also be written back together.
We adopt the same trust model as previous ORAM sys-
tems [29,44,49,60], where trusted clients access an untrusted
storage service provider (e.g., in-memory key-value store,
NVMe-based storage). Clients either directly access the server
machine that the service provider runs on through one-sided
communication or access a trusted proxy which then accesses
the service provider through one-sided communication.
We also adopt the same level of “security” and “privacy”
as existing ORAM solutions [29, 44, 49, 51, 60], where the
untrusted service provider should gain no information about
client data or access patterns. Thus, hiding the content of
data through encryption alone is not enough. In addition, no
information should be leaked about: 1) which data is being
accessed; 2) whether the access is a read or a write; 3) when
the data was last accessed; 4) whether the same data is being
accessed; or 5) the access pattern (sequential, random, etc).
5.2 One-Sided Oblivious RAM
Although proven to be cryptographically safe, existing
ORAM-based systems have high performance overhead, mak-
ing it too costly to be adopted in many datacenter environ-
ments. We now present our improved ORAM system design.
Our system is based on Path ORAM [49] but can significantly
outperform Path ORAM.
We propose to leverage one-sided communication to hide
data access information and to replace (costly) ORAM op-
erations with one-sided operations, thereby improving the
performance of ORAM. Although the basic idea is simple,
one needs to take extra care when applying it to provide the
same level of security guarantees as ORAM. For example, a
receiver (the malicious service provider) cannot detect when
a one-sided write happens. But it can take snapshots of data
content periodically and compare two snapshots to detect
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Figure 3: Read Performance of One-Sided ORAM X axis
shows the percentage of read operations that we use original ORAM
operations to perform. The two lines show the performance when
using a 100 Gbps and a 40 Gbps InfiniBand network.
modifications in between. It can then infer that a write hap-
pens by performing frequent snapshotting. Thus, one-sided
writes can still leak information to the service provider. Be-
cause of this, we use the unmodified ORAM write protocol
and only improve ORAM read performance.
Reading data using one-sided communication can be com-
pletely invisible to the service provider, even if the provider
performs snapshotting. For a read-only storage service, we
can safely replace all reads with one-sided communication.
However, in practice, most storage services are not read-only
and we need to deliver the second guarantee in Section 5.1 —
server should not be able to tell a read from a write.
We use a simple technique to achieve this security goal. By
default, we perform one-sided reads for client read requests
but randomly choose a certain amount of client read requests
(e.g., X% of all read requests) to perform original ORAM op-
erations. These ORAM-based read operations cannot be dis-
tinguished from write operations. Therefore, statistically, we
can deliver all the security guarantees. Meanwhile, perform-
ing a one-sided read is significantly faster than performing an
ORAM operation, since the latter requires read and write of
a whole path, while the former only performs a read to one
object. Although the algorithmic complexity of the modified
Path ORAM is still identical to the original Path ORAM, the
performance of our improved ORAM read is significantly
better than the original Path ORAM.
We implemented the original Path ORAM protocol and
our modified read mechanism using RDMA and tested their
performance with two network settings, a 40 Gbps Infini-
Band network and a 100 Gbps InfiniBand network. Figure 3
presents our modified read performance when changing X%
from 10% to 100% (under 100%, our system falls back to orig-
inal Path ORAM). Here, we use a pure-read workload in the
YCSB key-value store benchmark [7, 23], with 32,000 512-
byte key-value pairs. We encrypt all data with AES256. With
50% one-sided reads, we achieve around 2× performance of
pure Path ORAM.
5.3 Limitations and Discussion
One limitation of our one-sided ORAM solution is the require-
ment of prohibiting network packet sniffing. As described in
Section 3, most systems enable this prohibition by default.
However, if an attacker can bypass such prohibition mech-
anisms (e.g., when it controls a physical machine), it can
observe one-sided traffic. Thus, our threat model applies only
to other cases, for example, when the attacker only owns a
virtual machine.
One-sided NICs usually writes to memory through DMA.
There are methods for a server to track (all) DMA activities
(e.g., with processor counter monitor [21]). However, it is still
hard to pinpoint one-sided traffic, since other types of DMA
activities may be happening at the same time. Even if a server
can detect one-sided network traffic, it is still challenging to
tell whom the sender is and which data is being accessed.
Our current design does not consider parallel client accesses
to the secure data store, i.e., we only support either a single
proxy that delivers all client requests to the data store or a
single client that talks to the data store directly. Supporting
parallel client accesses to a secure data store is an important
goal in many distributed data store systems [8,44,49,60]. Our
design presented here serves as a building block in developing
a fully distributed ORAM system.
6 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
This paper provides the first and initial look into the security
aspect of one-sided network communication. We demonstrate
several vulnerabilities that are rooted in one-sided commu-
nication’s basic design philosophies. Although we have not
built real attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities yet, our
findings can be a starting point to explore potential attacks
and defenses for future researchers and practitioners.
This work is a warning for future one-sided hardware ven-
dors, software developers who want to use one-sided commu-
nication, and datacenters that have or plan to deploy one-sided
network systems. We believe that these three parties should
work together to achieve the security goals in datacenters
while preserving one-sided communication’s performance
and cost benefits. One promising direction is to leverage
programmable network devices like SmartNIC [32, 33] and
programmable switches [22, 27, 28] to implement security
defenses in hardware.
Although adding security guarantees to existing one-sided
communication technologies is not an easy job, we do not
believe the future of one-sided communication to be diminish-
ing. For all the vulnerabilities that we have identified in this
work, there are defense mechanisms that could potentially
work. Moreover, one-sided communication provides a great
opportunity to improve privacy, the security property that is
increasingly important in today’s cloud environments.
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